For Iranian-Americans with a more Westernized background, an identity crisis is not necessarily a problem as much as it is an identity confusion. The question appears to be "Who are we?" and not "What are we?" Iranians do not ask where they come from, for they maintain close cultural ties to Iran either through frequent visits, nostalgia, or memories. Iranian immigrants have strong connections either to the Iran of the present or, in most cases, the Iran of the past. Getting the balance right between what they perceive as the two sets of cultural characteristics is, especially for 1.5-2 and second-generation immigrants, the issue. They are Iranian. But they are also American. A main thrust of this work, therefore, concentrates on this duality through the examination of case studies (generated from Southern California Iranians living in Los Angeles, Irvine, and San Diego) and personal accounts in other works that present firsthand narratives by Iranian-Americans.
Southern California Iranians are used as the main source of data because they represent the middle-to upper-middle-class professionals who aspired to become more Westernized in Iran and who succeeded in importing their wealth, education, and experience to the United States. These immigrants are, for the most part, products of the Pahlavi era, in that they were economically prosperous, inclined to Western influence, and belonged to Iran's newly formed, predominately secular middle class. (Kelly and Friedlander 1993, p. 5) They were the majority class in Iran who not only immigrated with the principles of Westernization, secularization, urbanization, and modernization but also with traditional "Persian" and anti-Islamic, therefore anti-Muslim, ideals. They immigrated to Southern California prior to or soon after the Islamic Revolution. They came to the United States as professional or entrepreneurial immigrants living in exile while creating an identity in diaspora based on these notions. Although the status of Iranian immigrants varies from students to refugees and asylum seekers, this work focuses on the professional and entrepreneurial Iranian immigrants.
By creating a mainstream Iranian identity through the use of television media, Southern California Iranians are an important resource for research because they have become the main source of Iranian identity formation in the United States. The Iranian sociologist, Hamid Naficy, provides a comprehensive study of the mechanisms and effectiveness of Iranian television. In this work, television and radio are noted as the main tool of spreading Iranian culture, which has been imposed on and/or rejected by other Iranian groups living throughout the United States. Therefore, this study presents and analyzes how these Iranians view themselves, how and with what methods they have created an identity, how this identity then becomes a culture in diaspora, and whether or not these forces have been successful in creating a community within the American civil society context. This article asks whether the many different Iranian groups living in the United States share in the overarching identity created by the "majoritarian" Iranian immigrant and whether they can collectively be constituted as a community. Iranian immigrants in the United States are not homogeneous-they come from a variety of religious, linguistic, and ethnic backgrounds. The first section below focuses on the diaspora of the majoritystatus immigrants in Iran who came to the United States with either professional skills and/or money and analyzes how these specific immigrants construct an Iranian identity. This section also asks whether this identity has permeated into a shared cultural experience by all other Iranian immigrants such as the Kurds, Armenians, and Assyrians. In other words, has the Iranian-American identity created by the dominant group become accessible for Iranian subgroups and, consequently, has a community emerged from this identity?
Posing this question leads to understanding Iranian cohesiveness, or lack thereof, and the future possibilities of recognition as a community by the U.S. government-whether or not Iranian-Americans are an ethnic minority deserving of political recognition. Thus, the essay works through the assumption that minority rights and ethnic identities are important to American democracy and policy. The second section further analyzes Iranian identity by highlighting the mechanisms used in construction of the diasporic identity. This essay does not critique American democracy. Instead, it illustrates Iranian perceptions of American civic nationalism and how they accept democratic ideals. Therefore, the third section defines how immigrants are racialized as either black or white and how some immigrants, such as Iranians, absorb the role of "model minority" through assimilation. Through the examination of the various multicultural theories and policies, the third section analyzes how the United States manages, absorbs, or ignores immigrant and ethnic groups and whether Iranians themselves have created a community in the United States. It is important to understand the views of mainstream American society because without the acceptance from this society-especially in a civic nationalism where freedom and rights necessitate a political voice-the "other," immigrant, groups like Iranians will not obtain recognition or political representation.
Thus, the participation of middle-to upper-middle-class Southern California Iranians in answering a twenty-five-question survey guides this analysis of Iranian-American identity formation. The participants were contacted through the network of family, friends, and acquaintances as formal associations were difficult to find and cold calling Iranian names from a phone book was ineffective. The survey asked questions concerning how immigrants perceive Iranian and American culture, how they have adapted in the United States by separating their private domain of "Iranianness" from the public American one, and how they have assimilated into that public sphere. For the purpose of this article, the actors constituting the public sphere are defined as "Americans" (the majority mainstream) and "Iranians" (the minority substream)-not to be confused with the divisions between Iranian mainstream and its subgroups. The public sphere consists of the U.S. government, its institutions, and laws, the media in all its forms, and mainstream society.
It is not surprising that out of a hundred questionnaires sent, only twenty-three individuals responded. As this article argues, the preservation of the private domain outweighed the opportunity to have a voice in the public domain. Also, due to the political climate at the time of the actual study, shortly after September 11, 2001, many Iranians were not inclined to answer questions that they must have deemed too personal and risky. Therefore, to provide a more comprehensive study of Iranian-American identity, this essay uses data accumulated by other scholars such as Ron Kelly, Jonathan Friedlander, Dale E Eickelman, Hamid Naficy, Asghar Fathi, Roger Waldinger, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. The work of Zohreh Sullivan, Tara Bahrampour, Persis M. Karim, and Mohammad Mehdi Khorrami has provided further personal accounts from IranianAmericans. Moreover, the analyses and definitions of Iranian-American identity and culture in diaspora combine anthropological and sociological frameworks of theory, specifically constructivism to prove that Iranian-American identity constitutes a continuum of shared, lived, remembered experiences. The analysis of governmental policies toward immigrants and minority groups utilizes concepts derived from the multicultural paradigm to highlight espoused, but not necessarily applied, democratic idealism. Iranian immigrants range from all sectors, ages, and walks of society. They came from radical political backgrounds, working-class traditional families, and Westernized bourgeoisie and elite classes. They came as persecuted intellectuals, oppressed minorities, rich professionals, and educated workers. There are religious and ethnolinguistic differences among the Muslim, Jewish, Baha'i, Zoroastrian, Christian, Turkish, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kurdish, and Assyrian groups. They came as refugees, asylum-seekers, expatriates, immigrants, students, families, and individuals. In simple terms, these immigrants are a heterogeneous group who lived very different lives in Iran and endured extremely distinct experiences during the revolution. How then has this group of religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse people with different pasts constructed an Iranian identity in diaspora? Why is Iranian immigration even termed a diaspora?
Understanding Iranian diaspora lies on defining the term, and the various interpretations of what this phenomena means. Most scholars suggest that "diaspora" refers to ethnic minority groups who immigrate to various locations but still maintain ties to their country of origin. How strong these ties remain throughout time and how cohesive ethnic groups stay have become points of contention for scholars. The various definitions of diaspora indicate the academic attention scholars of anthropology, sociology, political science, and history pay to the processes of immigration and its interpretation into policy or theory. It can be surmised, then, that a diaspora consists of a group of people (a nation, an ethnic minority, a transnational community, or a displaced peoples) who have been forced into mass migration. Leaving their homeland for any number of years, maybe even the rest of their lives, these immigrants construct a new identity abroad through the use of imagination, nostalgia, and memories.
Of utmost importance to this work is the compositional definition of diaspora postulated by William Safran (1999, p. 365) for it proves the most applicable. He defines diaspora as expatriate minority communities who: 1) have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral," or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland-its physical location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not-and perhaps cannot be-fully accepted by their host country and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral home as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return-when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship. Although the Iranian immigrants in the United States are heterogeneous, they have been able to connect to one another through this collective remembrance and nostalgia. And this collective diasporic consciousness has been generated by Iranians in Southern California. Through the use of exile media-television, music, cinema, print, and radioIranians living in Los Angeles and Southern California have broadcasted an "Iranianness" rooted in the Iran of old, living in memories. Naficy (1993) argues that Iranian television programs and music videos produced in Los Angeles both reflect and shape the exile experience of the Iranian diasporic consciousness and identity. According to Naficy, there are more than eighty-six Persian-language periodicals published in Los Angeles, eighteen radio programs, twenty-seven feature fiction films made by Iranians in exile, and fifty-six regularly scheduled Iranian television programs including news broadcasts, music videos, and talk shows aired on three different channels-KSCI, Cablecast, and KRCA. All these media outlets promote the celebration of holidays and practice of mannerisms of the culture under the Pahlavi regime, which these immigrants lived, transposed, and conveyed to their offspring in diaspora. Along with shared traditions, other characteristics such as language, history, the role of the family, status, occupation, and interpretation of the American culture contribute to the formation of the Iranian diasporic identity.
According to the questionnaire, the main components of Iranian identity are family, education, hospitality, and artistic traditions. For example, a thirty-four year-old female wrote:
To me, many characteristics represent Iranian culture, both positive and negative characteristics. Some of the most prominent positive aspects of Iranian culture are hospitality, warmth of heart, strength in family ties, depth of emotions, and pride. Some negative characteristics I have observed often in Iranians are being judgmental, caring inordinately about social images, lack of organization and punctuality, lack of respect for or industry toward collective objectives, lack of an ability to balance individuality with familial and social obligations, and lack of honest introspection.
On the other hand, a thirty-four year-old male made an interesting distinction between Iranian and Persian identity: However, the nationalistic sentiments of Iranian citizens in Iran and of Iranian immigrants abroad are differently interpreted and expressed. Through the experiences of the Iranian diaspora came a new "remembered, imagined, and reconstructed mytho-historical narrative" of the past and meaning of culture. The trauma of the Islamic revolution and subsequent immigration has left Iranian immigrants nostalgic for a homeland that no longer exists, for a constant regeneration of "the way things were," and for a construction of an identity that not only incorporates their past lives and histories but also represents the experiences of their new lives.
Iranianness, as a diasporic creation, has not maintained nationalistic characteristics in the sense that it does not correlate with the contemporary nationalism expressed in Iran. In diaspora, the flag, national anthem, and political consciousness are all drastically different than those in Iran. Iranian immigrants have not only become U.S. citizens, but they are also outside the realms of Iranian nation-state authority. Thus, Iranianness can be understood as a collective identity that is devoid of a physical location (like a nation) but that incorporates the memories of a homeland along with its geography and history, as well as the process of immigration and experiences in a new country. Diasporic consciousness as a transnational identity "invents homes and homelands in the absence of territorial, national bases through.... memories of, and claims on, places that they can or will no longer corporeally inhabit" (Malkki 1992, p. 434). As Salman Rushdie (1991, p. 125) writes, "Migrants must, out of necessity, make a new imaginative relationship with the world, because of the loss of familiar habits." He argues that "they refuse to become totally assimilated into the host society, but they do not return to their homelands.... In the meantime, they construct an imaginary nation both of the homeland and of their own presence in exile." Therefore, Iranian diaspora immigrants live in an awkward position. They pine over a home they can never become a part of because the Iran of their memories no longer exists, and they reside within a state they must adapt to for survival. In the words of Rushdie (1999, p. 15), "We are now partly of the West. Our identity is at once plural and partial. Sometimes we feel that we straddle two cultures; at other times, that we fall between two stools."
According to James Clifford, diasporic consciousness is defined as making the best out of a bad situation. Clifford (1994, p. 312) states that experiences of loss and further marginality in the host country breed "skills of survival: strength in adaptive distinction, discrepant cosmopolitanism, and stubborn visions of renewal. Diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope as a defining tension." It could be argued that diasporic consciousness binds internal ethnolinguistic differences among Iranians because the sense of loss experienced in diaspora outweighs all other differences in the struggle of adapting and surviving in the new environment. According to Naficy (1993, p. 2), "it is a relationship that is not so much based on shared originary facts (birth, nationality, color, race, gender) than on an adherence to a common imaginary construction. Discourse thus replaces biology." Therefore, it would seem that the manufacturing of a diasporic identity would thus create a community among Iranians living in the United States. But, that has not been the case.
In Proposing that there exists an overarching diasporic identity might seem contradictory after emphasizing Iranian immigrant diversity. However, although this essay argues that an Iranian "community" does not exist, the collective identity based on the diasporic experience of living in the United States and having to adapt to the new society does. Mixing traditional Iranian (pre-Islamic) customs with new American political ideologies has created an Iranian-American identity that has nothing to do with the creation of a community-or lack thereof. In this sense, community refers to any group "provided that they have a certain internal organization and, what is more important, the ability to make representations to the authorities" (Touraine 2000, p. 163). A community consists of a "group identity orchestrated and produced in part through political institutional processes" (Bickford 1999, p. 86).
According to Max Weber ([1922] 1997, p. 15), belief in group affinity can have important consequences for the formation of a political community. He defined the basis of "ethnic" group identity as a "subjective belief in common descent because of similarities of physical type or customs or both, or because of memories of migration." Weber argued that this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation but does not "constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly on the political sphere." ([1922] 1997, p. 15), Iranian-Americans do "entertain a subjective belief" in their diasporic identity. Memories and nostalgia of the past and the reconstruction of its customs in the United States have propagated a group formation and ethnic membership. There exists a "presumed identity," but by using Weber's argument that this identity does not necessarily lead to the creation of a group, this essay argues that group formation does not necessarily lead to community formation. William Connolly (1991, p. 90) states that the ideal of community itself presses its adherents to treat harmonious membership and consensus not as contestable ends to be interrogated by the most creative means at their disposal but as vehicles of elevation drawing the community closer to the harmony of being.
Thus, Iranians in America have not created a "harmonious end that binds them together." In fact, "it is a normal mode of behavior for an Iranian to escape from other Iranians, or to ignore him wherever he meets one" (Ansari 1988, p. 26). According to Abdolmaboud Ansari (1988, p. 80), Iranians "suffer from mutual distrust and lack of social commitment. The immigrants state of mind is one of skepticism and distrust." The lack of alumni and other associational activities among Iranians shows this lack of cohesiveness, which is necessary to the creation of a community.
In Out of the first-generation participants in the study over the age of fifty-sixteen in allonly two claimed experience of prejudice or hatred, both of whom are male. One replied, "I have never been in a confrontational situation, only generalities." And the other wrote:
A sick-minded policeman once falsely arrested me in an Iranian party two doors from my residence. I was not under the influence of any substance nor had I drunk more than two glasses. In any case, I was not even going to drive home. I choose not to consider the man a typical officer but rather a person in need of psychiatric care. Obviously, I did not feel good about the circumstances especially since the average age of the partygoers was about higher thirties, my mother was present, and the average education was a graduate degree with all the guests being successful professionals and business people.
Thus, although Iranian-Americans are not exempt from prejudice-of course, now being part of the "axis of evil" does not help their situation-they seem to fair better than most other immigrant groups in the United States. In this instance, "better" means that many Iranians have managed to succeed economically. They have been able to use the U.S. economic system of free markets, competition and capitalism to their advantage. They have also been able to transfer their education, knowledge, and Iranian funds to the United States. Therefore, a large proportion of Iranian immigrants-with a slight initial decline in status upon immigration-were able to pursue the same occupations in the United States as they had in Iran (e.g., physicians, engineers, dentists, and selfemployed businessmen). Thus, "a combination of affluent and skilled exiles and former college students account for the unusually high socio-economic status of Iranians in the For immigrants the body performs an important role in the construction of identity as it is interpreted by the self and the other. According to William James (1890, p. 322), the body is the primary site of self-formation, preservation, and interest. The body is "just as much the entire vehicle of the self-feeling" as it is "the vehicle of the self-seeking." For Iranian-Americans, the "whiter" the body, the more attractive the appearance, and the greater the ability for assimilation of the public face, which translates to success. Of the twenty-three southern California Iranian-Americans responding to the questionnaire, when asked what ethnicity/race they mark in filling out census data (the choices were white, caucasian, or other), ten responded that they consider themselves "white," seven viewed themselves as "caucasian,"7 and four responded "other"-either Iranian/ Persian or Middle Eastern. This relatively modest compilation of data exhibits that the majority of Iranian-Americans consider "white" an appropriate categorization of their ethnicity/race. Thus, through transformations, Iranian-Americans reconstruct their public persona or outer identity to facilitate the process of assimilation. This image of "whiteness" has its roots in the racialization of many other immigrant ethnic groups. Throughout the history of immigration to the United States, it can be argued that "racialization" has been standard procedure in policies toward various immigrant groups. According to several scholars, such as Robert Miles and Stephen Small, racialization "refers to the ways in which diverse ethnic groups from Europe and Africa came to be defined as the white 'race' and the black 'race' in the colonization and conquest of the Americas" (Small, p. 49). The term also refers to the creation of race as a "human construct, an ideology with regulatory power within society" (Solomos and Back 1999, p. 68). Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994, p. 55) also argue that the racialization project has been institutionalized through social interaction in which "race, or the concept of race, continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world." Thus, racialization is an institutionalized process that all ethnic groups face upon immigration to and settlement in the United States. It permeates through many social institutions such as the government and the economy. For example, African, Irish, Italian, Mexican, and Cambodian (just to name a few) immigrants have been traditionally racialized as "black" minority groups. The Irish and the Italians have been able to escape negative identifications of laziness, backwardness, and ineffectualness through the process of assimilation. Other immigrants, beside Europeans, have also been positively racialized as "white," such as the Chinese, Japanese, Israelis, and Iranians and thus have been able to reap the benefits of a liberal society. In this process, color and race are prime signifiers of ethnicity and identification as exemplified in the population census. In the next section, examination of U.S. policies toward minority groups will be examined to consider whether or not the "American way" truly promotes liberal ideology.
As individuals, we are "marked by our birth, by the shape of the nose or the color of the skin" (Gorra 1995, p. 436 ). Yet, how these characteristics are marked or valued is the issue. Originating from racist colonial structures, racialization assigns negative identification to dark skin, a big nose, and kinky dark hair, whereas white skin, bright eyes, and fine features are marked with positive identification as being pure and perfect. To this day, many immigrants or ethnic groups observe their own bodies through this image of white purity, regard it as "negatively" marked, and face difficult circumstances; "Should they identify with this ideal and deny the particularities of their own bodies, or refuse this ideal and suffer delegitimation by the state?" (Takacs 1999, p. 596). As Franz Fanon (1967, p. 110) stated, "In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema." Racialization, therefore, creates a subjugation of the dark body, which then creates a negative consciousness of that body.
The Iranian immigrants of this study solve this dilemma by interpreting and transforming their bodies into the whitened form and separating their identity into two spaces, the public and private spheres. They have maintained a uniquely Iranian compartmentalization of Western values, incorporating U.S. civic society and individualism in the public sphere while perpetuating Iranian diasporic identity in the private sphere. The separation of the collective diasporic identity into public and private spheres reflects the plurality of being Iranian-American and the contextualization of particular types of behavior. The anthropologist Dale Eickelman (2002, p. 222) states that the distinction between these two spaces has roots in the Iranian language, writing, and interpretation of space:
The "architecture" of Iranian verbal interaction indicates a pervasive distinction between the "external" (zaher), public aspects of social action and speech and an "inner" (baten) core of integrity and piety revealed only to one's family and trusted intimates. In the "external" social world, characterized by insecurity and uncertainty, the cultural ideal is the clever dissimulator (zerangi), the shrewd and cynical manipulator capable of maintaining a "proper public face" and holding "true" feelings in check to trusted family and intimates.
Eickelman argues that Iranian social interaction originates from this linguistically cultural paradigm. Hence, Iranian verbal and social interactions include a highly structured contextualization of the self that exhibits itself in "domestic architecture and in the use of domestic space, where a separate room.... is set aside for public receptions and visiting, while another part of the house is reserved for family intimacy"(ibid.). Thus, IranianAmericans interpret and write space according to their perceptions of themselves and others, as a form of identification.
The analysis of space and its functions provides an important model for interpreting all types of identity. However, for people in diaspora this analytical framework of writing and interpreting space, as espoused by Andreas Glaeser in his examination of German identity after unification, furnishes a more suitable interpretation of identity formation. Surely, for those uprooted not only from their homeland but also from all previously comfortable and functioning (however questionable) categories of race, ethnicity, sexual preference, gender, class, and nation (Glaeser 2000, p. 9), the writing and reading of both public and private space becomes a more significant and telling demonstration of identity. According to Glaeser, the "writing of space" entails not only institutional uses (such as street signs and public announcements) but also a "beautification" of that space through decoration and individual arrangement of objects. Reading of space thus involves situating oneself in that space literally and rhetorically by identifying with that space through emotional ties (Glaeser 2002, pp. 42-66) . For Iranian-Americans, the writing of space transpires into a private (baten) and public (zaher) realm where different social interactions are codified and take place. Not only is this writing and interpretation of space manifested in the home through the tangible arrangement and use of living quarters but also in public through the maintenance of a "proper public face." It is found in the construction of a diasporic identity through the definition of the collective self as a dual/hyphenated/split identity that is Iranian-American.
As Stuart Hall (1996, p. 345) argues, identity "is always a structure that is split. It is something that happens over time, that is never absolutely stable, that is subject to the play of history over time and the play of difference." Arjun Appadurai (1996, p. 170) also expresses the construction of a split or dual identity for immigrants:
There is the seductiveness of a plural belonging, of becoming Americans while staying somehow diasporic, of an expansive attachment to an unbounded fantasy space. But while we make our identities, we cannot do so exactly as we please. As many of us find ourselves racialized, biologized, minoritized, somehow reduced than enabled by our bodies and our histories. Therefore, identity formation for immigrants not only involves internal influences guided by memories of the homeland, experiences of immigration, and from members of the ethnic group itself but also by outside influences-from the members, laws, and circumstances of the host culture. "An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized" (Connolly 1991, p. 64) . Without the other, recognition of collective identity, differences, or individuality is meaningless. Perhaps these definitions best suit Iranian-American identity formation for they illustrate the struggle between ethnic and civic identity in which the public sphere of mainstream society controls the processes of recognition, such as laws and the procedures of naturalization and citizenship.
Furthermore, the public sphere is also the site where many immigrant groups may be "othered" into a position of inferiority. The theory of "othering," asserted by both JeanPaul Sartre and Franz Fanon, argues that, originating from racist colonial institutions and structures, the black body has become inferior and wretched by the white man who is not only the other but also the master (Fanon 1967 Thus, beginning in the 1960s with a new set of liberal immigration policies, multiculturalism and pluralism started usurping the assimilationist melting pot notion with a presumably more liberal and democratic theory regarding society and social relations. Although some scholars criticize the theory, policies, and discourse that constitutes multiculturalism-claiming that "although a nation of ethnics, our established ethnic is WASPishness," which keeps "America white" (Reed 1997, p. xvi)-other scholars argue that "multiculturalism describes the reality of minority and ethnic diversity" in the United States (Glazer 1997, p. 10). By rejecting assimilation and the melting pot image, some scholars, such as Nathan Glazer, claim that multiculturalism "becomes a new image of a better America, without prejudice and discrimination, in which no cultural theme linked to any racial or ethnic group has priority, and in which American culture is seen as the product of a complex intermingling of themes from every minority ethnic and racial group" (1997, p. 11). Instead of the melting pot, such a multicultural society is metaphorically described as a "salad bowl" or the "glorious mosaic."
Glazer qualifies his analysis of multicultural theory by analyzing the various "directions" it can take. This means that multicultural theory has yet to be finalized. There are numerous explanations and definitions for multiculturalism. Clearly, the discourse circulating around this liberal ideology is extremely charged, opinionated, and voluminous, making multicultural policy-such as affirmative action and educational reform-highly debated and controversial. Therefore, an analysis of this debate would be too complex and beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, this essay shows how, as a liberal theory, multiculturalism espouses an extension of the democratic principles that are the founding ideals of American society.
Whether or not these principles have been fully realized or impartially implemented does not concern this work. The assumption states that ideals such as freedom, liberty, justice, and equality constitute a main thrust of what characterizes American culture or civic nationalism. According to Aihwa Ong (1993, p. 739), "neoliberalism, with its celebration of freedom, progress, and individualism, has become a pervasive ideology that influences many domains of social life. It has become synonymous with being American." Based on these assumptions, multicultural theory espouses that American culture can and should accommodate diversity because it is "the American way." Not only do multicultural advocates claim that American society is composed of immigrants with a liberal democratic tradition, but they also argue that the next phase of U.S. politics and society (i.e., the public sphere) should usher in a politics of equal recognition (Taylor 1994, p. 27 ). According to Charles Taylor (1994, p. 27), "democracy has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of demands for the equal status of culture." Hence, the ideal form of multiculturalism attempts to promote a "changing understanding of our nation, its values," along with its faults in order to influence policies regarding immigration (Glazer 1997 In its purest form, civic nationalism is devoid of race, ethnicity, gender, and class-all traditional categories of identification-so as to incorporate diversity while neutralizing differences. It espouses equality for every citizen and neutrality for the public sphere. There may very well exist a gap between the theory of American civic nationalism as defined above and its implementation and practice throughout American history. However, some immigrant groups give credence to this rhetoric and truly believe that to be an American means to be a citizen with rights. Iranian-Americans in this study are an example of this sentimentality toward and acceptance of American civic nationalism. According to Jilrgen Habermas, there are various levels of immigrant incorporation into the public sphere. Habermas (1994, p. 138) argues that, as a result of U.S. immigration policy, liberal interpretations of assimilation include an institutionalization of the autonomy of the citizens in the recipient society and the practice of the "public use of reason" through agreement with the principles of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, under this definition, "all that is expected of immigrants is the willingness to enter into the political culture of their new homeland, without having to give up the cultural form of life of their origins by doing so" (Habermas 1994, p. 139) . Then, the United States is a society that has a number of ethnic groups as loosely aggregated subcultures within the larger English-speaking society (Kymlicka 1995 , p. 15) or the mainstream. In this society, Iranians have been able to benefit from these liberal ideals as a "loosely aggregate subculture." They not only accept American civic nationalism, but they also willingly assimilate into the public sphere. For example, when asked what it means to be an American, Iranian participants stated unanimously: freedom, rights, and citizenship. Eightyone percent of the participants stated that they are Iranian-Americans. A fifty-three yearold woman wrote that being an "American is having cultural, religious, and political freedom. To be able to do what I want without having to be afraid of a secret police. To be able to work hard and make a good living. To have political power and be able to influence what happens in my society." However, interestingly enough, this same woman, who perceives Americanness as having "political power" and influence over society, does not feel represented by the U.S. government. When asked, she wrote, "No! I would love to see Iranians run for public offices and influence the policies of the U.S. government."
An eighty-six year-old woman wrote that American characteristics are "freedom, legal process, acceptance of foreigners and nonjudgmental." A forty-nine year-old man wrote that a person who has become an American by choice rather than by birth "is more of an American than otherwise." And a thirty-four year-old man:
To be an American means many different things to me, all of which embody the reasons why different ethnic populations are attracted to the United States. First and foremost is the belief that "anything is possible". . . . one's craft can lead to great achievements not just measured monetarily but through an appreciation (societal) and recognition that is received for an elite few in other countries. I embrace the spirit of freedom (in the true sense of the word). America is the final destination where I have found my wants and my desires, and America has allowed me to believe in myself and given hope to the realization of my dreams. America is also a melting pot, a cornucopia of different traditions who have found a common theme in their land. Thus, as well as restructuring the body and splitting the identity into two spheres, it can be argued that Iranian-American's acceptance of American ideological norms lends to their adaptation and relative prosperity as an immigrant group. By absorbing U.S. civicism and assimilating into the public sphere through the alteration of their bodies, IranianAmericans "live the American dream."
CONCLUSION
The study of American immigrants is important in understanding U.S. civilization, as it is one of the greatest immigrant states in all of history. As each new wave of immigration hits the United States, Americans (mainstream and substreams) are faced with new questions of identity and recognition. In order to inform and direct appropriate policies, new explanations need to arise to answer such questions as, "Who are we?" Thus, in the hopes of further developing a theory that may be applied universally, it is important to study all immigrant groups in the United States. Furthermore, such a study hopes to add
